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The Okada & Samreth (2012, EL) and Asongu (2012, EB; 2013, EEL) debate on 
„the effect of foreign aid on corruption‟ has had an important influence in policy 
and academic circles. This paper provides a unifying framework by using 
investment and fiscal behavior transmission channels in 53 African countries for 
the period 1996-2010. The richness of the dataset enables us to disaggregate 
countries into 16 panels depicting fundamental characteristics of corruption based 
on wealth-effects, legal origins, openness to sea, petroleum-exporting, regional 
proximity and religious domination. Findings unite the two streams of the debate 
and broadly suggest that while the „government‟s final consumption expenditure‟ 
channel is consistent with the latter author, the investment and tax effort channels 
are in line with the former authors. Justifications for the nexuses are provided. 
Policy implications on how to use foreign aid constraints in managing fiscal 
behavior as means of reducing (increasing) corruption (corruption-control) are 
discussed.  
JEL Classification: B20; F35; F50; O10; O55 
Keywords: Foreign Aid; Political Economy; Development; Africa 
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1.  Introduction 
  
oreign aid may be one of the most debated and controversial issues in international 
policy coordination. It has been motivated by a mixture of alleged economic interests, 
altruism, historical ties and geo-strategic (imperialist
1
) considerations. Grants and soft 
loans have been offered by donors of the Western capitalist world to developing countries 
especially after the decolonization process (Oya, 2006). Whereas foreign aid may be necessary in 
the short-term owing to certain humanitarian concerns, there has been an endless debate on the 
effectiveness of aid to Africa and the linkage among aid, conditionality
2
 and economic policies 
in recipient countries. This debate has led many analysts to call for alternatives (Oya, 2006)
3
. 
Accordingly, the Cold war and the battle for geopolitical control in Africa between superpowers 
was perhaps the most important determinant of soaring aid in the 1980s (Degnbol-Martinussen & 
Engberg-Pedersen, 2003).  
From the interesting literature on foreign aid and institutions, the debate has been 
centered along three preoccupations (Asongu, 2013a). Firstly, do donors allocate more to poor 
countries with better institutions? Secondly, does foreign aid induce worse or better institutional 
quality? Thirdly, how do outsiders engineer a transition from informal to formation institutions 
by means of foreign aid. The first issue is critical in the debate because there has been a wide 
                         
1
 The imperialist origin of poor institutions is still widely debated. See Alam (2004).  
2
 This debate on conditionality has recently intensified when the British and the U.S governments threatened to cut-
off aid to African nations because of the prosecution of gays, lesbians and transsexuals in recipient countries. Many 
African government officials and activists have seen the threat as an insult to both moral wellbeing and African 
values.  
3
 The debate has even been extended to areas of external assistance like structural adjustment policies by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). There is substantially documented evidence that the IMF‟s neoliberal policies 
have been: perilous to South Korean development after the 1997 crisis (Crotty & Lee, 2002, 2006, 2009), the main 
cause of the Argentinean crisis in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Levy & Duménil, 2006) and a cause of the failed 
privatization projects across Africa (Bartels et al., 2009).  
F 
 4 
supposition on the part of donors that aid would be more effective in countries with better 
institutions. How the question is answered also affects the manner in which the second question 
is tackled. Accordingly, if donors allocate more aid to countries with better institutions, this 
would create an incentive for policy reforms in the recipient country to adapt to better 
institutions. A substantial bulk of the literature has found no evidence substantiating the thesis 
that democracies or less corrupt states are rewarded with more aid than their less institutionally 
developed counterparts (Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Alesina & Weder, 2002). With regard to the 
second issue, a considerable bulk of the literature has also emphasized the negative incidence 
foreign aid has on institutional quality (Knack, 2001; Asongu, 2012a, 2013a) and democratic 
(Djankov et al., 2005), especially in ethnically fractionalized states (Svensson, 2000). Lastly, 
there is the challenging third question on how development assistance would practically go about 
transforming institutions in the interest of the recipient countries.  As far as we have reviewed, 
the transition from informal to formal institutions is a complex process and attempts by donors to 
introduce top-down formal institutions have not fared well in the complicated maze of bottom-up 
arrangements. Dixit (2004) has presented an interesting analysis to this concern by arguing how 
introducing rule-based institutions could actually make issues worse as they create outside 
opportunities for members of relationship-based networks
4
. The scope of the current paper is 
within the second question in light of a recent debate on the effect of foreign aid on corruption. 
The Okada & Samreth (2012) and Asongu (2012a, 2013a) debate on „the effect of foreign 
aid on corruption‟ has had an important influence in policy and academic circles. Accordingly, 
the debate lacks a unifying framework that synthesizes the thesis and anti-thesis. Both sides of 
the debate suffer from the insufficiency of modeling corruption as a direct consequence of 
                         
4
 Network members can later cheat on their partners and vamoose to operate in the rule-based system. Hence, a 
society could get caught in-between formal and informal institutional settings with neither working well.  
 5 
foreign aid. In light of Knack & Keefer (1995)
5
, we argue that investigating institutional quality 
as a direct effect of development assistance may be grossly misleading because it fails to account 
for mechanisms through which foreign aid is channeled. In uniting the two streams we argue that 
investment and fiscal behavior mechanisms are essential for a better understanding of the 
nexuses between aid and corruption. On the one hand, consistent with Easterly (2005), „Big-
Push‟ (Harrod-Domar and Solow growth) models which constitute the main theoretical 
underpinnings of foreign aid are premised on the need for large aid-financed increases in 
investment in order to bridge „poverty and institutional gaps‟. On the other hand, it is common 
sense to acknowledge that aid affects fiscal behavior in terms of government expenditure and tax 
effort.  Hence, the goal of this paper is to assess how development assistance affects corruption 
through investment and fiscal behavior mechanisms in 53 African countries. The richness of the 
dataset permits us to disaggregate the countries into fundamental characteristics of corruption 
(legal origins, petroleum exporting quality, political instability/conflicts, regional proximity, 
openness to sea, income-levels and religious domination), which add subtlety to the analysis.  
  Putting aside the direct contribution of this paper to the current debate, it indirectly has 
other policy relevant contributions to the literature. Firstly, a great bulk of the literature is based 
on data collected between 1960 and 2000. By using recent data (1996-2010), we provide an 
updated account of the nexuses under investigation. Secondly, the global economic downturn has 
sparked concerns about donor‟s continued willingness to give and commitment to foreign aid 
(Ahmed et al., 2011). Hence, assessing the incidence of aid on corruption in a comparative 
setting could throw more light on this aspect of the debate
6
.  Thirdly, a corollary of the second 
                         
5
 Knack & Keefer (1995, p. 223) have concluded that more indicators are needed to properly account for the quality 
of institutions.  
6
 Koechlin (2007) has recently reframed the debate by examining three ambitious books (Sachs's The End of 
Poverty, Bhagwati's In Defense of Globalization, and Easterly's The Elusive Quest for Growth), and has concluded 
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contribution is the shifting of policy space to aid alternatives from East Asia. Learning from the 
East Asian success stories has been hampered by an asymmetric bargaining power of African 
governments, vis-à-vis Western development partners
7
. Fourthly, there have been substantial 
changes in objectives announced by the donor community which have evolved from intensive 
industrialization programs advocated in the 1950s to more recent poverty-reduction and 
institutions-building objectives such the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Accordingly, 
with the year 2015 drawing near this study also provide policy options to donor and multilateral 
agencies on their assistance objective of building strong institutions.  
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines the theoretical 
underpinnings (with stylized facts), analyzes conflicts in the literature before presenting the 
scope and positioning of the paper in light of the ongoing debate. Data and methodologies issues 
are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 covers the empirical analysis. We conclude with Section 5.  
 
2. Foreign Aid and Development  
 
2. 1 Theoretical highlights and stylized facts 
 
 The concern of whether foreign aid improves growth and institutions in recipient 
countries can be traced back to the two-gap model (Chenery & Strout, 1966), which remains the 
most influential theoretical underpinning of the aid effectiveness literature. In the model, 
developing countries face serious constraints on savings and exports earnings that deter 
investment and growth (in economic and institutional terms). Despite severe criticisms since its 
                                                                               
that, the insights and drawbacks of these three books remind us that the status quo is not working and that a rich 
understanding of globalization and development requires a serious consideration of alternative visions of each. 
Some new ways of theorizing development in  light of the globalized systems of food production have included the 
USA led „genetically modified food aid‟ to the Southern African region, that is widely criticized by the European 
Union (Herrick, 2008).  
7
 For instance, the Chinese „cooperative and non-interference‟ oriented foreign aid and foreign direct investment 
(FDI) policies in Africa are viewed by some as better alternatives. Therefore, the outcome of this study may either 
reinforce the growing mentality or negate it.  
 7 
inception, this model has provided the underlying principles for early aid policies (Easterly, 
1999) and regression specifications in many aid-oriented empirical papers (Masud & Yontcheva, 
2005). 
 Over the past 50 years since the Official Development Assistance (ODA) programs were 
instituted, the issue of aid effectiveness has remained widely debated and unsolved. In 2005, 
Western economies tried hardest to save Africa. In July of that year, the Group of Eight (G8) 
agreed to double foreign aid to Africa from $25 billion a year to $50 billion to finance the „Big 
push‟, as well as cancel African aid-loans contracted during previous attempts at a „Big push‟. 
Prior to this effort, Africa was already the most aid-intensive region on the globe. In September 
of the same year, world leaders gathered at the United Nations to further discuss progress on 
reducing (if not ending) the stubbornly high poverty in the continent. To highlight some 
frustrating statistics, sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) contains 11% of the world‟s population, but 
produces only 1% of the world‟s GDP (Easterly, 2005). In the median African country, 43% of 
the population lives on less than $1 a day. On the World Food Program list, of the 23 countries 
with more than 35% of the population malnourished, 17 (73%) are in Africa. The long and brutal 
civil wars in many countries (Angola, Chad, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Liberia…etc) not to mention 
Rwanda‟s genocide and recent carnages in Dafur-Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(registering the world‟s highest causalities since the Second World War) are some recent 
memories that epitomize the state of institutions in Africa. Accordingly, seven of the eight recent 
cases of total societal breakdown into anarchy in the world known to the literature have been in 
Africa: Angola, Burundi, Liberia, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Zaire/Congo (beside 
Afghanistan). The political economy of foreign aid has been indirectly or directly linked to 
events before or after recent experiences in the collapse of institutions in Africa (Zimbabwe‟s 
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economic meltdown, the unending Egyptian revolution, Ivorian post-election nightmare, the 
Libyan crisis and the recent donor-bid on funds for war-torn Mali).  
 
2.2 Conflicts in the literature 
  
A substantial bulk of the literature has focused on the macroeconomic consequences of 
aid, but mixed results have been reported and those that have established significant positive 
effects face heavy methodological criticisms. The absence of analytical framework, heavy 
reliance on empirical evidence (which is often ambiguous at best) and inconclusive results with 
recently refined methodologies (Masud & Yontcheva, 2005), have left the subject matter widely 
open to debate. For organizational purposes, the highlighted conflicts on the effectiveness of aid 
on development is presented in two main strands summarized in Table 1 below: one advocating 
the negative consequences of aid and the other acknowledging the positive rewards of 
development assistance.  
The first strand entails authors presenting the case for the insignificant impact of aid on 
investment, savings, growth and institutions. Aid has been established to breed unproductive 
public consumption (Mosley et al., 1992) without increasing investment. This latter position has 
been supported by Boone (1996) and Reichel (1995). Ghura (1995) has pointed to the negative 
effect of aid on domestic savings whereas Pedersen (1996) has asserted that, foreign aid distorts 
development and leads to aid dependency. Very recent African aid-development literature has 
established that aid fuels corruption (Asongu, 2012a), a negative nexus that has been extended to 
other government quality dynamics of political stability, government effectiveness, rule of law, 
voice & accountability and regulation quality (Asongu, 2012b) irrespective of initial levels in 
institutional quality (Asongu, 2013a).  
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Table 1: Summary of conflicts in the literature 
Researchers Main findings 
 
First-strand: Aid does not lead to growth (development) 
 
Mosley et al. (1992) Aid improves unproductive public consumption and fails to promote growth. 
  
Reichel (1995) Aid fails to promote savings because of the substitution effect. 
  
Ghura (1995) Aid negatively affects savings. 
  
 
Boone (1996)  
Aid is insignificant in improving economic development for two reasons: 
poverty is not the effect of capital shortage and it is not optimal for politicians 
to adjust distortionary policies when they receive aid flows. 
  
Pedersen (1996) Aid distorts development and leads to aid dependency. 
  
Asongu (2012a)  Aid fuels corruption and mitigates the control of corruption. 
  
Asongu (2012b)  Aid is perilous to government quality dynamics.  
  
Asongu (2013a) Aid is perilous to institutional quality irrespective of initial levels of 
institutional development.  
 
Second-strand: Aid improves growth (development) 
 
Ghura (1995) Aid positively affects savings for good adjusters.  
  
Burnside & Dollar (2000) Aid can be effective when economic management and policies are good. 
  
Guillaumont &  Chauvet (2001) Aid effectiveness is contingent on environmental factors (hazards and shocks). 
  
Collier & Dehn (2001) Aid effectiveness depends on negative supply shocks. Targeting aid contingent 
on negative supply shocks is better than targeting based on good policies.  
  
 
Collier & Dollar (2001) 
The positive effect of aid on poverty depends on its impact on per-capita 
income growth and the impact of per-capita income growth on poverty 
mitigation. 
  
 
Feeny (2003) 
The sectoral allocation of foreign aid to Papua New Guinea has been broadly 
in accordance with a strategy to effectively reduce poverty and increase human 
wellbeing.  
  
Gomanee et al. (2003) Aid has both a direct effect on welfare and indirect effect through public 
spending on social services.  
  
Clement et al. (2004) Aid has a short-term positive effect on growth. 
  
Ishfaq (2004) Aid, in a limited way though, has helped in reducing the extent of poverty in 
Pakistan. 
  
Mosley et al. (2004) Aid has an indirect impact on poverty and the well-being of 
recipient countries. 
  
Addison et al. (2005) Aid increases pro-poor public expenditure and has a positive effect on growth. 
Aid broadly works to mitigate poverty, and poverty would be higher in the 
absence of aid. 
  
Fielding et al. (2006) There is a straight forward positive effect of aid on development outcomes.  
  
Minou & Reddy (2010) Aid positively affects growth in the long-term. 
  
Okada & Samreth (2012)  Aid reduces corruption.  
  
Resnick (2012) Aid has promoted democratic transitions in African countries in the 1990s.  
  
Source (Authors) 
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In the second strand, we find studies supporting the positive effects of aid on 
development. Among them, we shall highlight that of   Burnside & Dollar (2000) which 
concludes that aid can be effective when policies in place are good. The Burnside & Dollar 
(2000) work has received abundant comments from researchers (Guillaumont & Chauvet, 2001; 
Colier & Dehn, 2001; Easterly et al., 2003), whose findings have been challenged as being 
“extremely data dependent” (Clemens et al., 2004). Whereas Clemens et al. (2004) have shown 
that aid is beneficial in the short-run; Minou & Reddy (2010) have recently established that the 
beneficial effects could also be in the long-run. Gomanee et al. (2003) have concluded that aid 
has both a direct impact on welfare and an indirect effect via public spending and social services. 
The indirect position has been substantiated by Mosley et al. (2004) on poverty and wellbeing in 
recipient countries. While the effectiveness of aid is more straight forward for some (Ishfaq, 
2004; Addison et al., 2005; Fielding et al., 2006)
8
 and aid may promote democratic institutions 
(Resnick, 2012), the Okada & Samreth (2012) findings on „the effect of foreign aid on 
corruption‟ have recently been object of intense debate from an African perspective (Asongu, 
2012a, 2013a).  
 
2.2 Scope and positioning 
 
2.2.1 Scope: a current debate  
 
 As highlighted in the introduction, the Okada & Samreth (2012) and Asongu (2012a, 
2013a) debate on „the effect of foreign aid on corruption‟ has had an important influence in 
policy and academic circles. Okada and Samreth (O & S) have assessed the nexus in 120 
                         
8
 Addison et al. (2005) have concluded that aid solidifies pro-poor public expenditure and has a positive effect on 
growth as it broadly works towards poverty mitigation. Their stance that poverty will be higher in the absence of aid 
has been confirmed by Ishfaq (2004). Among the examined proponents of a positive aid-development nexus, 
Fielding et al. (2006) have been the most optimistic in their conclusion on a straight forward positive impact of aid 
on development outcomes. 
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developing countries for the period 1995-2009 and concluded that foreign aid generally reduces 
corruption and its reduction effect is greater in less corrupt countries. In response Asongu 
(2012a) has partially negated their criticism of the mainstream approach to the aid-development 
nexus. Using data from 52 African countries for the period 1996-2010, he has found that aid 
fuels (mitigates) corruption (the control of corruption) in the African continent and hence, 
concluded that the O & S finding for developing countries may not be relevant for Africa.  
 In light of the above, some scholars have informally criticized Asongu (2012a) for not 
taking into account the conditional element of the O & S finding (“…reduces corruption 
especially and its reduction effect is greater in less corrupt countries” p.1). In response Asongu 
(2013a) has extended the debate by: not partially negating the  methodological underpinning of 
O & S with a unifying empirical framework and; broadening the horizon of inquiry from 
corruption to eight institutional quality dynamics (rule of law, regulation quality, government 
effectiveness, democracy, corruption, voice & accountability, control of corruption and political 
stability). Core to this extension is a hypothetical contingency of the „institutional downside of 
foreign aid‟ on existing institutional quality such that, the institutional peril of development 
assistance maybe questionable when greater domestic institutional development has taken place. 
Based on this hypothesis of institutional thresholds for foreign aid effectiveness, the perilous 
character of development assistance to institutional quality is broadly confirmed in 53 African 
countries for the period 1996-2010 (Asongu, 2013a, p. 1).  
 In response, some scholars have informally pointed-out the lack of fiscal policy and 
investment channels in the debate. The debate in its present state has not deviated from the 
Fielding et al. (2006) position on a straight forward relationship between aid and development. 
Accordingly, consistent with Knack & Keefer (1995) who have concluded that more indicators 
 12 
are needed to properly account for the quality of institutions (p. 223), this paper further extends 
the debate by providing an indirect dimension to the nexus: transmission mechanisms of foreign 
aid to corruption.  
 
2.2.2 Positioning: fiscal behavior and investment mechanisms  
 
 We devote space to substantiating the theoretical and empirical underpinnings of the 
fiscal behavior and investment mechanisms in the aid-corruption nexus. As emphasized in the 
theoretical highlights above, the „Big-Push‟ model on which foreign aid is based suggests that 
Africa is poor because it is stuck in poverty and institutional traps (Easterly, 2005). To emerge 
from the traps, it needs a large aid-financed increase in investment: a „Big Push‟. Both the 
Harrod-Domar and the Solow growth models have been used to discuss these mechanisms. The 
underlying assumption here is the notion that the „Big Push‟ is destined to bridge the saving-
investment gap poor countries face (Rostow, 1960; Chenery & Strout, 1966; Easterly, 2005).  
From an empirical standpoint, in assessing the impact of foreign aid, a great chunk of 
studies have focused on the effect of aid-flows on GDP growth and other macroeconomic 
variables (investment or public consumption). Gomanee et al. (2003) have concluded that aid has 
both a direct effect on welfare and an indirect impact through public spending and social 
services. The indirect standpoint has been confirmed by Mosley et al. (2004) on poverty and 
wellbeing in recipient countries. Aid has also been established to breed unproductive public 
consumption (Mosley et al., 1992) without increasing investment. This latter point has been 
supported by Boone (1996) and Reichel (1995). Addison et al. (2005) have found that aid 
strengthens pro-poor public expenditure. Donors are concerned about how their aid is used 
especially the manner in which it affects the fiscal behavior of recipient countries because aid 
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and government fiscal behavior are linked through government spending and tax efforts 
(Morrissey, 2012). 
 Two aid mechanisms clearly standout from the theoretical and empirical underpinnings 
above: fiscal behavior and investment channels. Hence, the goal of this paper is to assess how 
development assistance affects corruption through investment and fiscal behavior mechanisms.  
 
3. Data and Methodology 
 
3.1 Data 
 
 We assess a sample of 53 African with data from the African Development Indicators 
(ADI) of the World Bank (WB) for the period 1996-2010. Limitations to African countries and 
periodicity have a twofold justification: on the one hand, they are consistent with the 
underpinnings of the debate and the other hand; indicators on corruption are not available before 
1996
9
.  The dependent variables are the corruption perception and corruption-control indexes 
(Asongu, 2012a).    
 
3.1.1 Determination of fundamental characteristics 
  
We now devote space to discussing the determination of fundamental characteristics 
which are critical for the relevance of the empirics. The simple intuition motivating this 
categorization is the interest of more focused policy options based on fundamental characteristics 
of corruption. Accordingly, government quality dynamics (transparency, regulation quality…etc) 
and macroeconomic characteristics have the limitation of being time-dynamic. Therefore, the 
same non-dummy threshold may not be consistent over time, especially on a horizon of 15 years. 
                         
9
 It should be noted that this time span is consistent with those employed by Okada & Samreth (2012), Asongu 
(2012a) and Asongu (2013a). The first have use data on 120 developing countries for the period 1995-2009, the 
second has used data on 52 African countries for the period 1996-2010 while the third has used data for the period 
1996-2010 from 53 African countries.  
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This is especially the case when short-run (business cycle) disturbances loom substantially large. 
To categorize the countries, we are consistent with recent African corruption-oriented literature 
on capital flight (Weeks, 2012; Asongu, 2013b) and software piracy (Asongu, 2012c). Hence, 
political instability or conflicts, petroleum exports, legal origins, income levels, regional 
proximity, religious domination and openness to sea (landlocked nature) are fundamental to 
corruption.  
 Firstly, the „conflict affected‟ characteristic presents analytical and practical issues. 
Difficulties arise in assigning countries to this category in an exclusive and non-arbitrary 
manner. Accordingly, few countries in Africa are completely conflict-free. Hence, distinctions 
must be made on the basis of degree and significance of conflict-span relative to data-span. 
Given the 53 countries over the period 1996-2010 two strands emerge: civil wars and 
conflicts/political strife. For the first strand on civil wars, few would object to the inclusion of 
Angola (1975-2002), Burundi (1993-2005), Chad (2005-2010), Central African Republic 
(plethora of failed coup d‟états between 1996-2003 and the 2004-2007 Bush War), Congo 
Democratic Republic, Côte d‟Ivoire (1999 coup d‟état, 2002-2007 civil war, rekindled in 2011), 
Liberia (1999-2003), Sierra Leone (1991-2002), Somalia and Sudan. In the second strand, 
despite the absence of some formal characteristics of civil war, we also include Nigeria and 
Zimbabwe due to the severity of their internal strife.    
 Secondly, concerning petroleum countries, a critical categorical objection is that some 
petroleum countries also clearly qualify as conflict-affected (e.g Angola and Sudan). As opposed 
to Weeks (2012) we impose no constraints of categorical priority. Hence, a country may fall in 
many categories if it has the relevant categorical characteristics. Accordingly for this class, 
arbitrariness also arises if a country qualifies for only a part of the time period, either because of 
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recent discovery or substantial declined in production. Another objection could by that; some 
producers (e.g Botswana) have macroeconomic characteristics similar to petroleum exporting 
countries. We take a minimalistic approach by adhering strictly to the petroleum category and 
including only countries whose exports have been oil-dominated for over a decade within the 
period 1996-2010: Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Congo Republic, Equatorial Guinea, 
Gabon, Libya, Nigeria and Sudan.  
 Thirdly, the premise of legal origin is based on: the emphasis legal origins place on 
private property rights vis-à-vis those of the state (La Porta et al., 1998); the empirical evidence 
on the link between legal origins and corruption (La Porta et al., 1999) and; recent African 
comparative institutional literature on the weight of legal origins on government quality 
(Asongu, 2013c) and property rights (Asongu, 2012c).  Accordingly, the hypothesis that English 
common-law countries place more emphasis on private property rights, while French civil-law 
focuses more on state power has been confirmed by recent African literature. Hence, the 
underlying logic for this segmentation is that the institutional web of informal norms, formal 
rules and enforcement characteristics affect corruption (corruption-control). The legal origin 
classification is guided by La Porta et al. (2008, p. 289).  
 Fourthly, the inclusion of income-levels to assess wealth-effects appears sound for a 
number of reasons. (1) Economic prosperity can be associated with an increase in rent seeking 
activities. (2) Recent African institutional literature has clearly established that wealth-effects are 
instrumental in institutional quality (Asongu, 2012d) especially corruption (Asongu, 2013d). 
Income-levels are based on the classification from the Financial Development and Structure 
Database (FDSD) of the WB.  
 16 
Fifthly, „religious influence‟ has been documented as a significant instrument of 
government quality. It is based on the intuition that religious institutions play a significant role in 
the fight against corruption due to their orientation towards morally sound citizens. Apart from 
the particularity of religious institutions on ethical related issues, Christianity and Islam 
significantly differ in the perception of punishments related to corruption. From an African 
standpoint, the edge of Christian dominated countries over their Islam oriented counterparts in 
corruption-control is consistent with Asongu (2012d, p. 191). Religious classification is in 
accordance with the Central Intelligence Agency‟s (2011) World Fact book. 
Sixthly, there is an institutional cost of being landlocked (Arvis et al., 2007) especially in 
terms of corruption. Based on a preliminary assessment from our data, Landlocked countries 
have a slightly higher average Corruption Perception Index (CPI) (3.04) than their counterparts 
which are opened to the sea (2.96).  
Seventhly, in order to add subtlety to the analysis we distinguish sub-Saharan Africa 
from North African countries. This distinction which is broadly in line with the World Bank‟s 
regional classification is relevant for regional policy implications. Moreover, such a 
classification has been essential to understand the dynamics of corruption-oriented literature on 
capital flight (Boyce & Ndikumana, 2008).  
 
3.1.2 Endogenous explaining, instrumental and control variables  
  
 The theoretical and empirical underpinnings for the endogenous explaining variables 
(channels) have already been substantially covered in Section 2.2.2. In light of the above ,we use 
aggregate investment dynamics (public and private) and fiscal behavior channels (government‟s 
final consumption expenditure and tax revenues), in accordance with the literature (Rostow, 
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1960; Chenery & Strout, 1966; Mosley et al., 1992; Boone, 1996; Addison et al., 2005; Reichel, 
1995; Easterly, 2005;  Morrissey, 2012).  
The instrumental variables include: Total Net Official Development Assistance (NODA), 
NODA from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries, NODA from Multilateral 
Donors (MD) and Grants excluding technical cooperation.  
Owing to identification constraints, we cannot control for many macroeconomic and 
structural characteristics. Accordingly, there are substantial constraints in the degrees of freedom 
needed for the Sargan overidentifying restrictions (OIR) test for instrument validity
10
. We have 
four foreign aid instruments and cannot model with more than three endogenous explaining 
variables. Where the linear instruments are complemented with a nonlinear pair, we cannot 
employ more than seven endogenous explaining variables. To avoid misspecification in the 
transmission mechanisms, we control only for economic prosperity and inflation. These two 
control variables are added to reduce the degree of identification when foreign aid instruments 
are invalid. From intuition, foreign indirectly fuels demand-pull inflation and directly increases 
GDP.    
Details about the summary statistics, correlation analysis (showing the basic correlations 
between key variables used in this paper), variable definitions (with corresponding data sources) 
and categorization of countries are presented in Appendix 1, Appendix 2, Appendix 3 and 
Appendix 4 respectively.  The descriptive statistics of the variables reveal that, there is quite a 
degree of variation in the data utilized so that one should be confident that reasonable estimated 
nexuses would emerge. The object of the correlation matrix is to mitigate concerns of 
                         
10
 An OIR test is only applicable in the presence of over-identification. That is, the instruments must be higher than 
the endogenous explaining variables by at least one degree of freedom. In the cases of exact- identification 
(instruments equal to endogenous explaining variables) and under-identifications (instruments less than endogenous 
explaining variables) an OIR test is by definition impossible. 
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overparametization and multicolinearity.  From the correlation coefficients, there do not appear 
to be any serious issues in terms of the relationships to be estimated.  
 
3.2 Methodology 
 
The paper adopts a Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Instrumental Variable (IV) 
estimation technique for two main reasons. While addressing the issue of endogeneity, the IV 
estimation underpinnings are consistent with the problem statement of the study. Our concern for 
endogeneity is valid on two main counts. Firstly, the CPI and corruption-control index are 
perception based measures that may be subject to public opinion bias owing to media 
propaganda for instance, hence issues of measurement error and omitted variables. Secondly, 
while investment and fiscal behavior affect corruption, the other way round cannot be ruled-out, 
hence the concern of reverse causality.  
The estimation procedure entails the following steps.  
First-stage regression:  
 itit sInstrumentInvestmentFB )(/ 10  it                                (1)                                                                                                          
Second-stage regression: 
 itit InvestmentFBCorruption )/(10  itiX   it                   (2)                                                                                        
In Eq. (2), X is a set of control variables which include: GDP growth and inflation. FB 
denotes Fiscal behavior which encompasses Government’s final consumption expenditure and 
Tax revenues. Investment entails Public investment and Private investment. Instrumental 
variables are: Total NODA, NODA from DAC countries, NODA from MD and Grants. For the 
first and second equations,  v  and u, respectively represent the error terms.  
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Three main steps are adopted in the estimation process. First, we justify the choice of the 
2SLS IV estimation strategy with a Hausman test for endogeneity. Second, we verify that the 
instruments are exogenous to the endogenous components of explaining variables (fiscal 
behavior and investment channels) conditional on other covariates (control variables). Third, we 
ensure the instruments are valid and not correlated with the error term in the equation of interest 
with an OIR test. Further robustness checks will be ensured with: (1) modeling with robust 
Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) standard errors; (2) usage of two 
corruption indicators and; (3) employment of linear and nonlinear instrumental variables. 
 
4. Empirical Analysis  
 
4.1 Presentation of results 
  
The section aims to examine two main issues: (1) the capacity of the exogenous 
components of fiscal behavior and investment mechanisms to explain corruption and; (2) the 
ability of the instruments to explain corruption through the mechanisms. While the first issue is 
addressed by the significance and signs of estimated coefficients, the second concern is tackled 
with the Sargan-OIR test. The null hypothesis of this test is the position that, the aid instruments 
explain corruption only through the fiscal behavior and investment mechanisms. Hence, a 
rejection of this null hypothesis is a rejection of the view that the instruments do not explain 
corruption beyond the proposed channels. A Hausman test is performed prior to the 2SLS-IV 
estimation. The null hypothesis of this test is the position that estimated coefficients by OLS are 
efficient and consistent. Hence, a rejection of this null hypothesis points to the concern of 
endogeneity due to inconsistent estimates and thus, justifies to the choice of the IV estimation 
technique. Given the problem statement of the paper, the Hausman is a necessary but not a 
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sufficient condition for the 2SLS-IV approach. Hence, we still employ the IV procedure even in 
the absence of endogeneity.  
 Table 2 below presents a summary of results in Tables 3-4. Modeling in Table 3(4) is 
based on linear (nonlinear) instruments. Panel A (B) of Tables 3-4 is concerned with the effect 
on corruption (corruption-control). Whereas Tables 3-4 assess the first and second issues 
highlight above, Table 2 is based on only the second issue. We are more interested in the second 
issue because it is premised on evidence of the first issue. In other words, the second issue can 
only be examined once the first has been confirmed.  The synthesis in Table 2 is based on the 
following information criteria: (1) the estimated coefficient should be significant; (2) the 
adjusted coefficient of determination should not be negative; (3) the Fisher statistics should be 
significant; (4) the null hypothesis of the Sargan OIR test should not be rejected for the validity 
of the foreign aid instruments; (5) the Hausman test has a purely informational role and is not 
indispensible for the validity of the model and; (6) a positive effect on the CPI indicates a 
decrease in corruption because the CPI measures corruption in decreasing magnitude.  
The following general conclusions could be drawn from Table 2. (1) With the 
instrumentality of foreign aid, tax efforts broadly decrease (increase) corruption (corruption-
control) while government‟s final consumption expenditure has the opposite effects.  (2) Foreign 
aid that is channeled through investment mechanisms (public and private) broadly mitigates 
(improves) corruption (corruption-control). (3) There are no significant asymmetries in the signs 
of dimensions in comparable fundamental characteristics. Hence, evidence of wealth-effect, 
legal-origin effect…. landlocked-effect cannot be genuinely established.  (4) Most of the 
significant control variables have the expected signs: inflation broadly encourages corruption as 
public officials turn to seek more rents in order to cope with rising prices and; economic 
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prosperity in African countries has been found to deteriorate corruption-control irrespective of 
initial corruption-control levels (Asongu, 2013e, pp. 43-44).  
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Table 2: Summary of Results 
 
                  
 Income Levels Legal Origins  Religious Dom. Regions  Resources  Stability  Landlocked(LL) Africa 
 UMI LMI MI LI English French Christ. Islam SSA NA Oil Non-oil Conflict Non-co. LL Not LL  
 Panel A: Specifications in Panel A of Table 3 (Corruption)   
Gov. Exp.  na - na na na na na na na -° - na na na na na na 
                  
Tax Rev.  + na na na na na na na na + + na na na na na + 
                  
Pub. Invt. na + na na na na na na na na - na - na na na na 
                  
 Panel B: Specifications in Panel B of Table 3 (Corruption-Control)   
Gov. Exp.  na na na na na na na na na -° - na + na na na na 
                  
Tax Rev.  na na na na na na na na na +° + na na na + na na 
                  
Pub. Invt. na + na na na na na + na na - na + na na na na 
                  
                  
 Panel C: Specifications in Panel A of Table 4 (Corruption)   
Gov. Exp.  - na na na na na - na na na - - na - na na - 
                  
Tax Rev.  na - na na +° na na - + + na na na + + na + 
                  
Pub. Invt. + + +° na na na na + + + + na +° na na +° na 
                  
Priv. Invt.  na + na na na + na + na + na + na + na na + 
                  
                  
 Panel D: Specifications in Panel B of Table 4 (Corruption-Control)   
Gov. Exp.  - na na na na na na na na na - - + na na na na 
                  
Tax Rev.  na na na na + na na + na - na na + na na na na 
                  
Pub. Invt. na + na + na na + - + + + na na na na na + 
                  
Priv. Invt.  - + na na na + + - na + na + - na na na na 
                  
Gov. Exp: Government Expenditure. Tax Rev: Tax Revenue. Pub. Invt: Public Investment. Priv Invt: Private Investment. UMI: Upper Middle Income. LMI: Lower Middle 
Income. MI: Middle Income. LI: Low Income. English: English Common-law. French: French Civil-law. Christ: Christianity dominated countries. Islam: Islam dominated 
countries.  SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa.  NA: North Africa. Oil: Petroleum exporting countries. Non-oil: Countries with no significant exports in petroleum. Conflict: Countries with 
significant political instability. Non-co: Countries without significant political instability. Dom: Domination. na: insignificant estimate or variable not included in model. °: 
negative coefficient of determination, significant Sargan OIR test (invalid instruments) or insignificant Fisher statistics. +(-): positive (negative) effect.  
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Table 3: Comparative assessment with linear foreign aid instruments (with HAC standard errors) 
 
                  
 Income Levels Legal Origins Religious Dom. Regions Resources Stability Landlocked (LL) Africa 
 UMI LMI MI LI English French Christ. Islam SSA NA Oil Non-oil Conflict Non-co. LL Not LL  
 Panel A: Corruption  
Constant  4.05*** 1.479 3.839*** 7.986 6.068 2.776 3.097 -1.434 1.922 -0.984 0.83*** 2.864 2.60*** 2.864 0.087 4.689*** 1.879* 
 (0.000) (0.352) (0.003) (0.310) (0.188) (0.472) (0.540) (0.921) (0.648) (0.466) (0.000) (0.284) (0.000) (0.284) (0.980) (0.000) (0.055) 
Gov. Exp.  -0.023 -0.288** -0.204 0.090 -0.100 -0.024 -0.113 -0.785 -0.084 -0.2*** -0.009*** -0.068 -0.021 -0.068 0.060 -0.018 -0.061 
 (0.428) (0.035) (0.223) (0.587) (0.355) (0.496) (0.380) (0.796) (0.460) (0.000) (0.000) (0.462) (0.365) (0.462) (0.526) (0.870) (0.491) 
Pub. Invt. 0.041 0.359** 0.141 -0.164 -0.329 -0.004 -0.009 0.414 0.050 0.154 -0.07*** -0.050 -0.08*** -0.050 0.168 -0.207 --- 
 (0.599) (0.049) (0.271) (0.608) (0.261) (0.989) (0.971) (0.722) (0.817) (0.284) (0.000) (0.748) (0.001) (0.748) (0.460) (0.086)  
Tax rev. 0.02*** 0.035 0.005 -0.347 -0.005 0.031 0.039 0.345 0.073 0.22*** 0.08*** 0.057 --- 0.057 0.039 --- 0.091** 
 (0.000) (0.309) (0.920) (0.455) (0.959) (0.724) (0.791) (0.783) (0.560) (0.000) (0.000) (0.468)  (0.468) (0.500)  (0.013) 
                  
Hausman  17.7*** 5.533 6.182 12.91*** 18.0*** 0.690 7.405* 8.124* 6.330* 13.0*** --- 13.87*** 3.43*** 13.87*** 1.941 25.82*** 5.361* 
 (0.000) (0.136) (0.103) (0.004) (0.000) (0.875) (0.060) (0.043) (0.096) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.584) (0.000) (0.068) 
Sargan OIR 2.661 0.002 1.757 0.001 0.172 2.55 1.051 0.002 1.786 0.305 0.004 0.542 3.060 0.542 0.131 4.977* 0.436 
 (0.102) (0.963) (0.184) (0.973) (0.677) (0.110) (0.305) (0.960) (0.181) (0.580) (0.948) (0.461) (0.216) (0.461) (0.717) (0.083) (0.803) 
Adjusted R² 0.051 0.463 0.025 -0.063 -0.035 0.022 0.060 -0.056 0.183 -0.097 0.869 0.107 0.100 0.107 -0.057 0.011 0.183 
Fisher  8.02*** 3.621** 2.436* 0.699 1.486 0.215 1.499 0.116 2.026 39.0*** --- 2.964** 17.1*** 2.964** 0.360 2.452* 5.488*** 
                  
 Panel B: Corruption Control 
Constant  -0.019 -1.811 0.662 -0.283 0.618 -2.306 -0.987 -1.2*** -2.590 -2.01** -1.2*** -2.848 -1.9*** -2.848 -1.513** -2.347 -3.122 
 (0.914) (0.135) (0.776) (0.808) (0.631) (0.403) (0.704) (0.000) (0.531) (0.025) (0.000) (0.558) (0.000) (0.558) (0.036) (0.165) (0.640) 
Gov. Exp.  -0.024 -0.000 -0.209 0.040 -0.072 0.033 -0.061 -0.006 -0.069 -0.07*** -0.004* -0.076 0.01*** -0.076 -0.005 0.062 -0.076 
 (0.243) (0.999) (0.333) (0.357) (0.163) (0.617) (0.337) (0.835) (0.555) (0.000) (0.064) (0.561) (0.000) (0.561) (0.786) (0.367) (0.627) 
Pub. Invt. 0.047 0.288** 0.064 -0.005 -0.076 0.203 0.079 0.107** 0.200 0.029 -0.03*** 0.242 0.30*** 0.242 0.064 0.223 0.266 
 (0.205) (0.034) (0.851) (0.931) (0.583) (0.518) (0.578) (0.015) (0.491) (0.498) (0.000) (0.580) (0.000) (0.580) (0.331) (0.356) (0.650) 
Tax rev. 0.006 -0.027 -0.008 -0.047 -0.001 0.016 0.016 --- 0.061 0.09*** 0.03*** 0.059 -0.005 0.059 0.022* 0.023 0.065 
 (0.165) (0.105) (0.838) (0.505) (0.968) (0.623) (0.837)  (0.623) (0.000) (0.000) (0.626) (0.858) (0.626) (0.075) (0.266) (0.642) 
                  
Hausman  8.717** 12.60*** 21.08*** 6.148 26.3*** 6.853* 6.441* 3.922 5.908 6.392* --- 5.910 12.4*** 5.910 8.379** 8.654** 4.112 
 (0.033) (0.005) (0.000) (0.104) (0.000) (0.076) (0.092) (0.140) (0.116) (0.093)  (0.116) (0.000) (0.116) (0.038) (0.034) (0.249) 
Sargan OIR 0.001 1.707 0.064 0.350 1.697 1.050 0.413 0.453 0.016 0.474 2.216 0.097 0.087 0.097 1.384 0.385 0.048 
 (0.964) (0.191) (0.799) (0.553) (0.192) (0.305) (0.520) (0.797) (0.896) (0.490) (0.136) (0.755) (0.767) (0.755) (0.239) (0.534) (0.824) 
Adjusted R² -0.012 0.197 -0.026 0.021 -0.035 0.255 -0.002 0.016 0.123 -0.109 0.519 0.099 0.474 0.099 0.230 0.161 0.097 
Fisher  1.958 9.188*** 0.443 2.282* 2.352* 0.270 0.848 2.945* 0.707 2133*** 1e^14*** 0.546 68.6*** 0.546 4.436*** 2.300* 0.403 
                  
Instruments  Constant, Total NODA, NODADAC, NODAMD, Grants 
                  
***, **,*: significance levels of  1%,  5% and 10% respectively. P-values in parentheses. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions test. UMI: Upper Middle Income. LMI: Lower Middle Income. MI: Middle 
Income. LI: Low Income. English: English Common-law. French: French Civil-law. Christ: Christianity dominated countries. Islam: Islam dominated countries.  SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa.  NA: North 
Africa. Oil: Petroleum exporting countries. Non-oil: Countries with no significant exports in petroleum. Conflict: Countries with significant political instability. Non-co: Countries without significant 
political instability. Gov. Exp: Government Expenditure. Pub. Invt: Public Investment. Tax rev: Tax revenues.  HAC: Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent. NODA: Net Official 
Development Assistance. DAC: Development Assistance Committee. MD: Multilateral Donors. NODADAC: NODA from DAC countries. NODAMD: NODA from Multilateral Donors. The relevance 
of bold values that depict the information criteria is threefold. 1) Rejection of the null hypothesis of the Hausman test for the presence of endogeneity. 2) The significance of estimated 
coefficients and the Fisher statistics. 3) The failure to reject the null hypothesis of the Sargan OIR test for instrument validity. 
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Table 3: Table 4: Comparative assessment with nonlinear foreign aid instruments (with HAC 
standard errors) 
 
                  
 Income Levels Legal Origins Religious Dom. Regions Resources Stability Landlocked (LL) Africa 
 UMI LMI MI LI English French Christ. Islam SSA NA Oil Non-oil Conflict Non-co. LL Not LL  
 Panel A: Corruption  
Constant  2.522 1.298** 1.211 0.860 3.218 2.24*** 0.868 -1.567 -1.265 -0.9*** 2.30*** 2.211 2.50*** -0.789 2.564*** 2.733*** -0.584 
 (0.130) (0.012) (0.218) (0.621) (0.225) (0.000) (0.840) (0.118) (0.280) (0.000) (0.000) (0.549) (0.000) (0.523) (0.000) (0.000) (0.650) 
Gov. Exp.  -0.075* 0.043 -0.059 -0.006 -0.039 -0.009 -0.075** -0.015 -0.079 -0.033 -0.04** -0.081** -0.018 -0.073* 0.001 -0.055 -0.073* 
 (0.090) (0.169) (0.510) (0.567) (0.152) (0.744) (0.028) (0.514) (0.145) (0.372) (0.032) (0.016) (0.334) (0.088) (0.815) (0.606) (0.087) 
Pub. Invt. 0.21*** 0.293*** 0.304*** 0.067 -0.100 0.048 0.124 0.49*** 0.206** 0.51*** 0.21*** 0.024 -0.064* 0.141 0.005 0.246** 0.145 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.376) (0.489) (0.176) (0.564) (0.000) (0.021) (0.000) (0.000) (0.892) (0.063) (0.227) (0.861) (0.040) (0.124) 
Tax rev. --- -0.03*** 0.018 -0.003 0.078** --- 0.094 -0.10** 0.15*** 0.10*** --- 0.053 --- 0.135** 0.01*** --- 0.118*** 
  (0.000) (0.715) (0.966) (0.025)  (0.480) (0.032) (0.001) (0.000)  (0.613)  (0.015) (0.000)  (0.007) 
Priv. Invt. 0.046 0.040*** --- 0.074 -0.052 0.054** 0.029 0.22*** 0.035 0.25*** -0.004 0.064* --- 0.047* -0.020 0.034 0.062* 
 (0.635) (0.000)  (0.115) (0.625) (0.046) (0.188) (0.000) (0.163) (0.000) (0.929) (0.058)  (0.060) (0.391) (0.599) (0.066) 
GDP growth -0.005 --- 0.124 0.011 --- -0.094* -0.130 --- --- -0.259* -0.09*** -0.151 --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.968)  (0.345) (0.764)  (0.078) (0.549)   (0.077) (0.000) (0.358)      
Inflation  0.030 --- --- 0.023 --- --- 0.018 --- --- --- -0.06** --- --- 0.015 --- -0.214* --- 
 (0.663)   (0.458)   (0.816)    (0.023)   (0.821)  (0.051)  
Hausman  19.1*** 14.24*** 10.45** 11.573* 8.142* 14.2*** 31.51*** 16.7*** 27*** 66.8*** 70.2*** 36.3*** 0.744 31.85*** 6.465 13.59*** 21.66*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.033) (0.072) (0.086) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.689) (0.000) (0.166) (0.008) (0.000) 
Sargan OIR 0.250 1.899 11.53** 2.927 18.1*** 1.642 2.466 1.097 2.099 0.353 0.140 2.184 12.39* 2.953 4.013 12.614** 1.665 
 (0.969) (0.754) (0.021) (0.231) (0.000) (0.801) (0.291) (0.894) (0.717) (0.949) (0.986) (0.534) (0.053) (0.398) (0.404) (0.013) (0.796) 
Adjusted R² 0.010 0.641 0.054 0.097 0.149 0.175 0.158 0.306 0.285 0.195 0.020 0.140 0.093 0.242 0.325 0.015 0.269 
Fisher  152*** 39.52*** 3.651*** 2.228* 3.518** 5.67*** 3.79*** 23.9*** 8.73*** 4e^14**
* 
1516*** 3.58*** 24.9*** 9.970*** 1058*** 1.554 7.04*** 
                  
 Panel B: Corruption Control 
Constant  -0.635 -1.55*** -0.723 -1.21*** 0.628 -1.9*** -1.387* 1.665 -1.048 -1.9*** -0.91*** 2.211 -1.59*** -0.825 -2.332 -3.309* -1.402 
 (0.395) (0.000) (0.191) (0.007) (0.382) (0.00) (0.072) (0.221) (0.187) (0.000) (0.000) (0.549) (0.000) (0.436) (0.344) (0.097) (0.129) 
Gov. Exp.  -0.012* 0.012 -0.020 -0.023 --- 0.031 -0.023 --- -0.014 0.0009 -0.02** -0.08** 0.01*** -0.026 -0.019 0.098 -0.015 
 (0.094) (0.427) (0.679) (0.456)  (0.240) (0.260)  (0.412) (0.912) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.372) (0.399) (0.254) (0.355) 
Pub. Invt. -0.007 0.095* 0.016 0.103** 0.016 0.171 0.102*** -0.162* 0.081** 0.16*** 0.09*** 0.024 0.035 0.079 0.085 0.026 0.100** 
 (0.889) (0.058) (0.842) (0.013) (0.817) (0.239) (0.000) (0.086) (0.030) (0.000) (0.000) (0.892) (0.633) (0.238) (0.451) (0.592) (0.035) 
Tax rev. --- -0.001 0.013 0.008 0.045** -0.014 --- 0.086** --- -0.04*** --- 0.053 0.038** --- 0.017 0.405 --- 
  (0.847) (0.186) (0.734) (0.029) (0.595)  (0.031)  (0.000)  (0.613) (0.023)  (0.255) (0.211)  
Priv. Invt. -0.003 0.030*** --- --- -0.080 0.04*** 0.085** -0.120* 0.061 0.09*** -0.006 0.064* -0.032* 0.068 0.025 -0.001 0.079 
 (0.933) (0.000)   (0.184) (0.000) (0.039) (0.060) (0.114) (0.000) (0.242) (0.058) (0.058) (0.260) (0.801) (0.978) (0.118) 
GDP growth 0.139** 0.027*** 0.067** -0.026 --- -0.091 -0.188** --- -0.16** -0.04** -0.07*** -0.151 --- -0.215*** 0.107 -0.104 -0.17** 
 (0.034) (0.002) (0.014 (0.562)  (0.571) (0.019)  (0.027) (0.010) (0.000) (0.358)  (0.000) (0.313) (0.725) (0.029) 
Inflation  0.07*** -0.02*** --- -0.005 -0.08*** --- --- -0.13** --- -0.010 0.01*** --- --- --- -0.01*** 0.001 --- 
 (0.004) (0.000)  (0.248) (0.003)   (0.0125)  (0.475) (0.000)    (0.005) (0.948)  
Hausman  13.17** 2.256 1.987 12.33** 81.2*** 6.617 53.07*** 25.3*** 34.2*** 20.8*** 43.8*** 36.36*** 85*** 50.09*** 8.443 20.52*** 26.16*** 
 (0.021) (0.894) (0.737) (0.030) (0.000) (0.250) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.207) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sargan OIR 2.505 3.668 21.33*** 1.842 0.384 1.550 2.148 0.487 5.337 0.496 1.172 2.184 1.203 4.627 0.260 0.1101 4.038 
 (0.474) (0.159) (0.000) (0.605) (0.983) (0.670) (0.708) (0.974) (0.254) (0.780) (0.759) (0.534) (0.877) (0.327) (0.877) (0.946) (0.400) 
Adjusted R² 0.100 0.753 0.040 0.106 0.040 0.294 0.049 0.099 0.053 0.268 0.046 0.140 0.810 0.006 0.074 0.088 0.065 
Fisher  5.01*** 190.7*** 1.912 5.154*** 6.28*** 4.68*** 5.006*** 17.5*** 3.280** --- --- 3.583*** 1e^6*** 2.822** 15.84*** 1.549 2.361* 
                  
Instruments Constant, Total NODA, NODADAC, NODAMD, Grants, (Total NODA)², (NODADAC)², (NODAMD)², (Grants)² 
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***, **,*: significance levels of  1%,  5% and 10% respectively. P-values in parentheses. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions test. UMI: Upper Middle Income. LMI: Lower Middle Income. MI: Middle 
Income. LI: Low Income. English: English Common-law. French: French Civil-law. Christ: Christianity dominated countries. Islam: Islam dominated countries.  SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa.  NA: North 
Africa. Oil: Petroleum exporting countries. Non-oil: Countries with no significant exports in petroleum. Conflict: Countries with significant political instability. Non-co: Countries without significant 
political instability. Gov. Exp: Government Expenditure. Pub. Invt: Public Investment. Priv. Invt: Private Investment. Tax rev: Tax revenues.  HAC: Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent. 
NODA: Net Official Development Assistance. DAC: Development Assistance Committee. MD: Multilateral Donors. NODADAC: NODA from DAC countries. NODAMD: NODA from Multilateral 
Donors. The relevance of bold values that depict the information criteria is threefold. 1) Rejection of the null hypothesis of the Hausman test for the presence of endogeneity. 2) The 
significance of estimated coefficients and the Fisher statistics. 3) The failure to reject the null hypothesis of the Sargan OIR test for instrument validity. 
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4.2 Discussion of results, policy implications and caveats  
 
4.2.1 Discussion of results 
 
 For over 50 years, the political economy of foreign aid has been substantially debated in 
academic and policy-making circles. A great chunk of the literature on institutions and 
development has concluded that Africa is poor because it lacks good institutions: lack of 
property rights, weak courts and contract-enforcements, dictatorships, political instability, hostile 
regulatory environment for private business and high corruption (Easterly, 2005; Kodila-Tedika, 
2012, 2013). According to this strand, in order to end poverty in Africa, the West needs to 
promote good institutions in the continent. With the concern of how aid could promote good 
institutions in aid-recipient countries, a substantial bulk of the literature has focused on how 
institutions matter in the effectiveness of development assistance (Alesina & Dollar, 2000; 
Alesina & Weder, 2002; Knack, 2001; Dixit, 2004; Djankov et al., 2005). This paper has focused 
on the second strand of the challenges (highlighted in the introduction) by extending an ongoing 
debate on „the effect of foreign aid on corruption‟ using investment and fiscal behavior 
transmission mechanisms.  From the available weight of empirical evidence (summarized in 
Table 2), we have broadly established that, but for government‟s final consumption expenditure, 
tax efforts and investment channels (public and private) decrease (increase) corruption 
(corruption-control). 
 
a) Corruption, (the composition of) government expenditure and aid 
 On the general negative nexus between government expenditure and corruption-control, 
we argue that government‟s final expenditure (both in collective and individual consumption 
terms) offers a breeding ground for more rent seeking and corrupt activities. The key idea here is 
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that corrupt politicians and/or government officials would try to channel public funds to those 
expenditures that provide more lucrative opportunities for bribery. Consistent with Shleifer & 
Vishny (1993), corrupt officials will choose to spend money on goods whose true value is 
difficult to be identified by agents. While problems due to information do arise again and this 
hypothesis has not been examined using static or dynamics frameworks, it is reasonable to 
assume that it is quite appealing. Hence, expenditure on military and high technology goods are 
some candidates for providing such lucrative opportunities. In fact, corruption and military 
spending have been found to be closely associated (Gupta et al., 2000) especially in military 
aircraft (Hines, 1995). No surprising the worst post-apartheid corruption scandal (that has 
embroiled President Jacob Zuma) has been linked to the purchase of military equipment.  In the 
same vein, in terms of high technology, the „Albatross‟ jet affair that has rocked the 
Cameroonian institutional landscape has seen the arrest of many high profile politicians over the 
spectacular disappearance of  $ 25 million destined for the purchase of a presidential plane.  
 Conversely, expenditures on education do not seem to provide any opportunities at all. 
For instance, it would be difficult for a government official to collect bribes for appointing 
unqualified persons to teaching positions. This line of interpretation could be extended more or 
less to expenditures on health although one can argue that sophisticated hospital equipment could 
give rise to opportunities of bribery. Hence, it is natural that a recent budget scandal in South 
Africa has been the government‟s spending of R4 billion on entertainment, catering and travel 
allowance in 2011 whilst under-spending in health initiatives, leaving 47% of metropolitan South 
Africans dissatisfied. This confirms recent findings that corruption is associated with low 
spending on education and health in developing countries (Mauro, 1998; De la Croix & 
Delavallade, 2007).  
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 In light of the above, the instrumentality of foreign aid in the composition of government 
expenditure that induces corruption is obvious. Accordingly, the project approach to foreign aid 
has underestimated the incentive problems with aid delivery. Thus, health and education 
ministries must be motivated to get medicines and school inputs to the citizens. Moreover, donor 
bureaucracies themselves must have the incentive to make sophisticated infrastructural projects 
work. Firstly, looking at health, some of the initial progress in Africa has slowed possibly due to 
corruption (Easterly, 2005, p.8). Studies in Guinea, Cameroon, Uganda and Tanzania estimated 
that 30 to 70% of government drugs disappeared before reaching the patients and complicated 
health problems cannot be solved with routine methods (Filmer et al., 2000; Prichett & 
Woolcock, 2004). Secondly, as regards education, while enrollments have expanded rapidly, the 
quality of education has been hampered by missing inputs like textbooks and other school 
materials, weak incentives for teachers and corruption in education bureaucracies (Filmer & 
Pritchett, 1997). Thirdly, on the bureaucracy of sophisticated projects, there have been some 
alarming dysfunctional signs. For instance, donors have spent over $2 billion over the last 20 
years on roads in Tanzania, but the roads have not improved. In fact the principal output has 
been aid bureaucracy, with the Tanzanians producing 2,400 reports for the 1000 donor missions 
and government experts each year. To summarize the three points highlighted above with an 
example, Swaziland is good candidate that substantially relies on foreign aid, spends over 55% 
of its public spending on the wage bill, loses nearly double the annual social service budget to 
corruption, sells food aid and deposits the money in foreign bank accounts…etc.  
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b) Tax effort, corruption and aid 
 The positive nexus between tax effort and corruption-control is consistent with the bulk 
of studies that have argued that a more legitimate and responsive state (in terms of voice & 
accountability and corruption-control) is an essential factor for more adequate level of tax effort 
in developing countries (Bird, 2007). Accordingly, the main reason for low tax effort in African 
countries may be that it is not in the interest of those who dominate the political institutions of 
such countries to increase taxes. Hence, if institutions are modified to produce more „pro-fiscal‟ 
outcomes
11
, it is an indication of decreased (more) corruption (corruption-control) and growing 
voice & accountability. The underlying intuition motivating this argument is that for more taxes 
to be collected less tax funds should be siphoned by tax collecting officials or less tax officials 
should be bribed into not collecting the required amount of taxes. Another explanation of the 
relationship inherently lies in the definition of corruption. Accordingly, „the effect of corruption‟ 
which is typically defined as the abuse of public power for private benefit is captured by an 
index that measures that extent to which bribes are generally expected by government officials in 
relation to, inter alia, tax assessments, trade licenses and exchange controls. Thus it is logical to 
infer that the rise in tax revenues is significantly associated with a weakening in corrupt activities 
that stand on the way of tax efforts.  
 Fixing tax revenue targets as has been the case of some African countries in recent 
decades increases tax efforts, tax revenues and consequently decreases corruption related to the 
collection of taxes. A good example is Cameroon where the adoption of revenue targets at the 
                         
11
 Our results are consistent with Mkandawire (2011) „on tax effort and colonial heritage‟ in the position that 
English common-law countries are likely to witness this scenario.  
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Douala Seaport
12
 has led to an unprecedented surge in revenue and at the same time unraveled 
corruption networks. 
 The instrumentality of foreign aid in the above highlighted nexuses could be explained by 
institutional requirements of donor agencies, especially in terms of voice & accountability. 
Accordingly, when Western agencies require institutions to be more accountable to development 
assistance, this may lead to increased tax efforts for two main reasons. Firstly, authorities in 
place may want to show that they need grants because their tax revenues are not enough to 
finance government projects. The only proper way is doing this is proving that current tax efforts 
are genuine and not tainted by corruption practices. Secondly, depending on the composition of 
aid, concessional loans are associated with higher domestic revenue mobilization. This 
explanation is consistent with empirical evidence which suggest that for those countries with 
high levels of corruption, the decline in revenues completely offset the increases in grants (Gupta 
et al., 2003). Moreover the positive association between aid and tax effort that ultimately 
increases corruption-control may be due to a higher composition of loans in the development 
assistance (Benedek et al., 2012). It is only natural that more tax should be collected to service 
the loans.  
 
c) Investment, corruption and aid 
 As far as we have reviewed, while there are many studies on the impact of corruption on 
investment (Baliamoune-Lutz & Ndikumana 2008), very few works have assessed this 
relationship the other way round. Larrain & Tavares (2004) which have investigated the 
incidence of foreign investment on corruption is the study that is closest to the current analysis: 
foreign aid destined for investment purposes can also be indirectly considered as foreign direct 
                         
12
 We chose the Douala Seaport as an example because; it serves both Cameroon and other neighboring landlocked 
countries like Chad and the Central African Republic.  
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investment (FDI) used by Larrain & Tavares (2004). Our findings differ from those of Larrain & 
Tavares (who has established that FDI is significantly associated with lower levels of corruption) 
from three main standpoints: the use of a more updated database; the instrumentality of aid in the 
effect and conditionality of bureaucracies in the effect.  Firstly, we have used a more updated 
dataset (1996-2010) in comparison to their study which used data for the period 1970-1994. 
Secondly, in our results the nexus between investment and corruption is contingent on foreign 
aid. Thirdly, it should be noted that the positive effect of investment on corruption-control, 
conditional on aid does not amount to investment effectiveness. Accordingly, in the vein of the 
highlighted Tanzanian case on roads construction above, aid-led-investments may substantially 
increase accountability through more layers of bureaucracy. Hence, more funds allocated for the 
projects may be spent on consultancies which eventually lead to the ineffectiveness of the project 
while at the same time increasing corruption-control. Ultimately, if foreign aid is destined to less 
sophisticated public and private investments, whose true values are not difficult to be identified 
by agents, then corrupt officials are less likely to siphon.  
 
d) How the findings reconcile the debate  
 
 The Okada & Samreth (2012) and Asongu (2012a, 2013a) debate has centered along two 
main axes. While the former has presented a case for the negative incidence of aid on corruption 
in developing countries, the latter has rejected the findings within the context of Africa. Our 
results have reconciled the debate by using fiscal policy and investment channels of foreign aid 
to corruption. Accordingly, while the „government‟s final consumption expenditure‟ channel is 
broadly consistent with Asongu (2012a, 2013a) in the perilous (mitigating) effect of aid to (on) 
corruption (corruption-control), the investment and tax effort channels are broadly in accordance 
with Okada & Samreth (2012). The former nexus is broadly in line with the first strand of the 
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literature that has firmly established a negative aid-development nexus (Mosley et al., 1992; 
Reichel, 1995; Ghura, 1995; Boone, 1996; Pedersen, 1996) while the latter relationship is in 
accordance the bulk of studies that have concluded on the beneficial effects of aid (Ghura, 1995; 
Burnside & Dollar, 2000; Guillaumont & Chauvet, 2001; Collier & Dehn, 2001, Collier & 
Dollar, 2001; Feeny, 2003; Gomanee et al., 2003; Clement et al., 2004; Ishfaq, 2004; Mosley et 
al., 2004; Addison et al., 2005; Fielding et al., 2006; Minou & Reddy, 2010; Resnick, 2012).  
 
4.2.2 Fighting corruption with foreign aid through constraints on fiscal behavior  
 
 Donor agencies can condition aid on the improvement of the fiscal system and 
management. We shall briefly discuss „revenue side‟ and „expenditure side‟ constraints on which 
foreign aid can be conditioned to improve fiscal behavior in an effort to fight corruption.  
 On the revenue side of fiscal management the following constraints are worthwhile. First, 
a tax administration reform that will see the implementation of important anti-corruption 
measures within the tax administration, including updating and modernizing tax agency 
procedures; restructuring of internal organization based on function (identification, assessment, 
billing…etc) rather than by type of tax; limiting the discretionary power of tax officials; reducing 
the number of clearances that are required from taxpayers to complete compliance processes ( 
i.e., the number certifications, forms, stamps, signatures… etc); tax liability self-assessment and 
exploring the use of electronic filling. Second, semi-autonomous revenues authorities are also 
necessary. Accordingly, when properly implemented, this enclave approach to tax administration 
reform will increase the possibility of de-politicizing tax officials, increase wage levels for tax 
officials and strengthen internal monitoring mechanisms. These semi-autonomous authorities 
have already been introduced in countries as diverse as Bolivia, Malaysia, New Zealand, 
Singapore, Guatemala, Ghana, Guyana, Kenya, Malawi, Mexico, Peru, Rwanda, South Africa, 
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Tanzania, Uganda, Venezuela and Zambia (Talercia, 2003; Bird, 2004; Martinez-Vazquez et al., 
2006). Third, reforms of the tax system can reduce opportunities for corruption and simplifying 
the tax system by reducing the number of discretionary tax incentives, deductions and 
exemptions.  
 On the supply side of the fiscal management, the following constraints are applicable. 
Firstly, a modern treasury system should be installed so as to improve transparency in cash 
management and disbursement of resources for items authorized in the budget, required for the 
consistency between budget formulation and budget execution. It is important for the treasury to 
operate separately from spending agencies and discretionary power of treasury officials can be 
mitigated by separating departments responsible for each budget execution stage. Secondly, 
financial management reforms should be required by aid agencies in order to strengthen basic 
procedures of budget accounting, auditing and reporting. Accordingly, the public expenditure 
management system should take advantage of integrated financial management systems and 
information technologies. Thirdly, a public spending tracking system should be developed to 
identify leaks in the budget implementation stage.  Fourthly, a procurement system reform 
should be required to ease the establishment of standardized procurement processes, ensure 
maximum exposure and competition of foreign and national bidders as well as satisfy 
international procurement standards. Since procurement systems can be particularly useful if 
coupled with the necessary administrative capacity, independent auditing of the procurement 
procedures should be conducted regularly and reviewed by parliament. Fifthly, a comprehensive 
coverage of the budget should minimize extra-budgetary and off-budget accounts in order to 
maximize transparency in the use of public resources. Sixthly, strategies that emphasize political 
representation and accountability are necessary since broad political contestability decreases the 
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opportunities of state capture. Ordinary citizens should have access to relevant information 
regarding public spending, including parliamentary debates on the budget formulation. 
Seventhly, civil service reform should be oriented towards key measures that reduce the 
probabilities of corruption and patronage such as: professionalization and de-politicization of 
public servants, merit-based recruitment and reduction of turnover rates. 
 Besides imposing constraints to improve fiscal behavior from the revenue and 
expenditure sides in aid-recipient countries, donors should also require an intergovernmental 
fiscal structure that favors the decentralization of spending responsibilities and revenue sources. 
This will improve local governments‟ greater autonomy and increased accountability to citizens 
can be instrumental in reducing corruption in the aid-funded projects.   
 
4.2.3 Caveats and future research directions 
 
 Owing to the scope and positioning of the paper, in the analysis we have failed to 
incorporate two main distinctions that could have provided more focused policy implications. 
Firstly, the distinction between concessional loans and grants in the measurement of 
development assistance will enable a better understanding of the instrumentality of aid in the 
nexuses. For example, the type of foreign aid that increases tax efforts. Secondly, it would have 
been interesting to decompose government expenditure into its constituent elements as to 
understand which components favor corrupt activities, since politicians and/or government 
officials would try to channel public funds to those expenditures that provide more lucrative 
opportunities for bribery. Therefore, the above caveats are interesting future research directions.  
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5. Conclusion 
 
The Okada & Samreth (2012, EL) and Asongu (2012, EB; 2013, EEL) debate on „the effect of 
foreign aid on corruption‟ has had an important influence in policy and academic circles. This 
paper has provided a unifying framework by using investment and fiscal behavior transmission 
channels in 53 African countries for the period 1996-2010. Findings have reconciled the debate 
and broadly suggest that while the „government‟s final consumption expenditure‟ channel is 
consistent with the latter author, the investment and tax effort channels are in line with the 
former authors. Justifications for the nexuses have been provided. Policy implications on how to 
use foreign aid constraints in managing fiscal behavior as means of reducing (increasing) 
corruption (corruption-control) have been discussed.  
 
 
 
Appendices  
 
Appendix 1: Summary Statistics 
 
 Variables Mean S.D Min. Max. Observations 
       
Corruption   Corruption Perception Index   2.984 1.065 1.000 6.400 462 
Corruption Control Index   -0.607 0.623 -2.495 1.086 622 
       
Fiscal 
Behaviour   
Government Expenditure   4.392 12.908 -57.815 90.544 468 
Tax Revenues  17.693 10.096 0.116 61.583 262 
       
Investment   Public Investment   7.449 4.500 0.000 39.984 655 
Private Investment  12.979 9.400 -2.437 112.35 658 
       
Control 
variables  
GDP growth  4.763 7.293 -31.300 106.28 759 
Inflation    57.556 955.55 -100.00 24411 673 
       
 
Instrumental 
variables  
Total  NODA 10.811 12.774 -0.251 148.30 704 
NODA from DAC countries  6.244 8.072 -0.679 97.236 704 
NODA from Multilateral Donors 4.481 5.512 -1.985 64.097 704 
Grants  0.069 0.115 0.000 1.477 773 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Upper Middle Income 0.188 0.391 0.000 1.000 795 
Lower Middle Income 0.226 0.418 0.000 1.000 795 
Middle Income 0.415 0.493 0.000 1.000 795 
Low Income  0.584 0.493 0.000 1.000 795 
English  0.377 0.485 0.000 1.000 795 
French  0.622 0.485 0.000 1.000 795 
Christianity  0.622 0.485 0.000 1.000 795 
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Categorization  Islam   0.377 0.485 0.000 1.000 795 
Sub-Saharan Africa  0.886 0.317 0.000 1.000 795 
North Africa  0.113 0.317 0.000 1.000 795 
Oil  0.188 0.391 0.000 1.000 795 
Non-oil 0.811 0.391 0.000 1.000 795 
Conflict  0.226 0.418 0.000 1.000 795 
Non-conflict  0.773 0.418 0.000 1.000 795 
Landlocked  0.283 0.450 0.000 1.000 795 
Not Landlocked  0.716 0.450 0.000 1.000 795 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation.  Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum.  
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Appendix 2: Correlation Analysis 
 
             
Fiscal Behavior Investment Control variables Foreign Aid and Grants  Corruption  
Gov. Ex Tax rev. Pub. Ivt Priv. Ivt GDPg Inflation Total NODA NODADAC NODAMD Grants CPI CC  
1.000 0.098 0.120 0.054 0.103 -0.139 0.039 0.038 0.021 0.036 -0.053 0.082 Gov. Ex 
 1.000 0.347 0.448 -0.040 -0.213 -0.309 -0.304 -0.277 -0.290 0.496 0.508 Tax rev. 
  1.000 -0.037 0.120 -0.072 0.195 0.141 0.220 0.075 0.089 0.215 Pub. Ivt 
   1.000 0.372 -0.042 -0.222 -0.181 -0.240 -0.174 0.291 0.151 Priv. Ivt 
    1.000 -0.057 0.053 0.034 0.073 0.069 -0.047 -0.054 GDPg 
     1.000 -0.004 0.009 -0.022 0.007 -0.047 -0.077 Inflation 
      1.000 0.955 0.900 0.808 -0.229 -0.146 Total NODA 
       1.000 0.733 0.780 -0.217 -0.148 NODADAC 
        1.000 0.716 -0.217 -0.123 NODAMD 
         1.000 -0.178 -0.117 Grants  
          1.000 0.886 CPI 
            CC 
             
             Gov. Ex: Government Expenditure. Tax rev: Tax revenues. Pub. Ivt: Public Investment. Priv. Ivt: Private Investment. GDPg: GDP growth. NODA: Net Official  
             Development Assistance. DAC: Development Assistance Committee. MD: Multilateral Donors. NODADAC: NODA from DAC countries. NODAMD: NODA from MD. 
             CPI: Corruption Perception Index. CC: Corruption Control Index.  
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Appendix 3: Variable Definitions 
 
Variables  Signs Variable Definitions (Measurement) Sources 
    
Corruption  Perception  
Index  
CPI Corruption Perception Index or perceived levels of 
corruption (the misuse of public power for private benefit) 
as determined by expert assessments and opinion surveys. 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
 
Corruption Control Index 
 
CC 
Control of corruption (estimate): captures perceptions of 
the extent to which public power is exercised for private 
gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, 
as well as „capture‟ of the state by elites and private 
interests. 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Government Expenditure  Gov. Ex Government Final Consumption Expenditure (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Tax Revenue  Tax rev. Tax Revenue (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Public Investment  Pub. Ivt Gross Public Investment (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Private Investment  Priv. Ivt Gross Private Investment (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
GDP  Growth  GDPg Average annual GDP growth rate World Bank (WDI) 
    
Inflation  Inflation  Consumer Price Index (Annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Foreign Aid (1) Total  Aid Total Net Official Development Assistance (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Foreign Aid (2) DAC Aid NODA from DAC Countries (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Foreign Aid (3) DAC Aid NODA from Multilateral Donors (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Grants  Grants  Grants excluding technical cooperation (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  NODA: Net Official Development Assistance. DAC: Development Assistance Committee.  
 
Appendix 4: Categorization of Countries 
 
Category  Panels Countries Num 
    
 
 
Income 
Levels 
Upper Middle 
Income  
Algeria, Botswana, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Libya, Mauritius, Namibia, Sao 
Tome & Principe, Seychelles, South Africa.  
10 
   
Lower Middle 
Income  
Angola, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Côte d‟Ivoire, Egypt, Lesotho, Morocco, Nigeria, 
Senegal, Sudan, Swaziland, Tunisia. 
12 
   
Middle 
Income  
Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Côte d‟Ivoire, Egypt, 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Lesotho, Libya, Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, 
Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, 
Tunisia.  
   22 
   
 
Low Income  
Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo 
Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, The Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Tanzania, Togo, 
Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.  
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Legal 
Origins  
English 
Common-law 
Botswana, The Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Namibia, Nigeria, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
    20 
   
 
French Civil-
Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, 
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law  Côte d‟Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tomé & Principe, Senegal, Togo, Tunisia. 
33 
    
 
Religious 
Domination 
 
 
Christianity  
Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African 
Republic, Congo Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, Côte d‟Ivoire, Equatorial 
Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Sao Tomé & Principe, 
Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
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Islam  Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, The Gambia, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia. 
20 
    
 
 
Regions  
 
 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, 
Central African Republic, Comoros, Congo Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, 
Côte d‟Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,  Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
Somalia, Sudan, Rwanda, Sao Tomé & Principe, Seychelles, South Africa, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
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North Africa  Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania,   Morocco, Tunisia. 6 
    
 
Resources  
Petroleum 
Exporting 
Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Congo Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, 
Libya, Nigeria, Sudan.  
10 
   
 
Non-
Petroleum 
Exporting  
 Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, 
Comoros, Congo Democratic Republic,  Côte d‟Ivoire, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Egypt, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,  Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania,  Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Rwanda, Sao Tomé & Principe, 
Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe.  
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Stability  
Conflict  Angola, Burundi, Chad, Central African Republic, Congo Democratic Republic, 
Côte d‟Ivoire, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Zimbabwe.  
  12 
   
 
 
Non-Conflict  
Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso,  Cameroon, Cape Verde, Comoros,  
Congo Republic, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, The 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,  Kenya, Lesotho, Libya,  Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, 
Senegal, Rwanda, Sao Tomé & Principe, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia. 
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Openness to 
Sea 
Landlocked  Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, 
Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
15 
   
 
Not 
landlocked 
Algeria, Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Comoros, Congo Democratic 
Republic, Congo Republic, Côte d‟Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, 
Eritrea, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,  Kenya, Liberia, 
Libya,  Madagascar, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan,  Sao Tomé & Principe, Seychelles, 
South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia. 
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Num: Number of cross sections (countries) 
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